Colenso battle
Sir Redvers Buller arrived in Frere on December 6th 1899 and set up his headquarters at the station. Frere was a sleepy village comprising the station, an hotel and a few tin roofed houses, probably five or six buildings at the most. A heliograph message is sent by Buller on the 11th December 1899 to General Sir George White stating that he will proceed to the west of Colenso. News of the failures of Gatacre and Methuen in the Cape on the 12th December 1899 leads Buller to question his plans. Another heliograph message is sent to White informing him that the will be on the 17th December 1899.
On the other side of the Tugela, Louis Botha was digging trenches in the lower faces of the ridges north of Colenso. The sand from these diggings was deposited about 30 metres behind the trenches and it was at this sand that the British concentrated their fire, thus missing the trenches. Botha was therefore able to avoid the initial bombardment by the Naval guns and ensure that the British got close enough to wreak havoc with their marksmen. The Boer forces numbered some 4500 with less than 3000 engaged in the battle. The Boer Artillery comprised five pieces, one 120 mm Krupp howitzer, three 75mm Krupp field guns and an automatic or “Pom Pom”.
Botha assumed that the British would attack to the east and was adamant that a force should be kept on Hlangwane to prevent this. The Zoutpansberg and Boksburg Commandos were detailed but retreated on the 13th, in spite of pleading by Botha. Eventually the Wakkerstroom, with some volunteers from other units, returned just one hour before Buller attacked.
The first British bombardment by the Naval guns began on the 13th December 1899 and their fire was concentrated on the Colenso Koppies where the British thought they could clearly see Botha’s trenches.
On the evening of the 14th Buller called a meeting of his staff officers to inform them that the attack will commence the following morning and not the 17th as they had discussed earlier. General White was not informed and by 4.30 am that army were ready to move: 15 628 infantry, 2500 mounted, 250 Navy with 1000 artillery and others.
The 14th and 66th Battery Royal Field Artillery were intended to soften up the in readiness for the infantry to attack. The rest of the artillery were to prepare the ground for Hart’s Brigade at the Loop. The balance of the Naval guns on Gun Hill began their long-range bombardment at 5.30 am. Instead of positioning his guns some distance from the enemy Colonel Long chose to proceed to within 1100 metres of the enemy. This was unheard of since artillery were normally placed behind the infantry. No sooner had he brought his guns into position than the Boers opened up, at first with rifle fire but was soon followed by their artillery. Colonel Long’s guns were lined up textbook fashion providing the enemy with perfect targets.
For a while it appeared that Long was gaining the upper hand but the Boer marksmanship was starting to tell. By 6.30 am Long was severely wounded as were most of his officers and the order was given to retire to a nearby donga. General Barton’s and Hildyard’s Brigades were positioned to the left and right of the railway and should have been moved up to support Colonel Long.
On the far west flank, General Hart’s Irish Brigade had been moved with the intention of crossing the Tugela at Bridle Drift and approaching the enemy from behind. Hart believed in doing things by the book and set his infantry in typical parade ground order to march across the open veldt. Two batteries of artillery were to Harts left with, further left again, there were the 1st Royal Dragoon Guards.
The scene is thus set for what was thought to be a ‘crafty’ attack on the enemy but what sadly turned out to be a near massacre of the Irish regiments. In spite of several warnings from Colonel Burn-Murdock, Hart kept his troops moving across the veldt until he was almost at the river. For some unknown reason the native guide directed them to the right and it will never be known why Hart allowed himself to be put into this predicament because, if he had looked at the map, he would have seen what a trap this “loop” would prove to be. They had been moving along a plain track up to the river but now found they were in virgin veldt.
When they were almost at the bottom of the loop, the enemy opened fire with devastating effect on the Irish. Still Hart would not allow them to break order and seek cover. They took what cover they could however with those managing to reach the river looking for somewhere to cross. The situation became untenable with Hart ordering more and more men into the “loop”. Men were falling all around as a result of the murderous and accurate fire from the Boers. Hart was not lacking in courage and was to be seen encouraging his men at every turn. By 7 am Buller, seeing the debacle unfolding before him and orders Hart to retire.
General Lyttleton’s 4th Brigade was to cover their withdrawal which took approximately ninety minutes to complete. Throughout all of this Lieutenant Colonel Parsons maintained a steady bombardment of the Boers, covering both Harts attack and withdrawal. Meanwhile Lord Dundonald’s mounted troops were moving to the extreme eastern side to occupy Hlangwane and cover Colonel Long’s flank with the 13th Hussars in support. Having made their way to within two kilometres of Hlangwane they dismounted and proceeded on foot, only to be met by a very strong defence from the Boers. Colonel Thorneycroft found it impossible to continue
without reinforcements and called on General Barton for these. Barton refused and this can only be attributed to his fear of making decisions, without first getting official approval.
Buller had blundered by not taking Hlangwane which may have enabled him to withdraw Long’s guns without loss.
Having made the decision to pull Hart’s brigade from the loop, he then gave no more thought to the left flank and instead he concentrated his strength on the central attack. He decided to move forward to observe the action for himself. No sooner had he arrived than he was informed that Long had run out of ammunition. This contradicts Louis Botha’s
account of the battle, where he states that his own men had captured twelve ammunition wagons containing some 1300 shells.
Hildyard meanwhile had directed two of his battalions towards Colenso. The Surrey’s moved to a point to the left of the guns, between the Tugela and railway, with the Devonshire’s to a point behind the guns. The Naval guns continued their fire toward the enemy; the Surrey’s crept forward to the Iron road bridge where they were joined by a group of Devonshire’s and Irish Fusiliers.
It was at this point that Buller called off the fight and asked for volunteers to rescue Long’s guns. Amongst these was Freddie Roberts son of Lord Roberts who with, several other men, attempted the rescue. The exercise proved futile resulting in heavy casualties to both men and horses. Freddie Roberts was fatally wounded. In all six Victoria Crosses were awarded for the rescue of two guns.
It has often been debated whether Buller should have pushed his forces to capture Colenso since less than half of his available force were put into action. Under cover of darkness he could have, in all probability, extracted all twelve of the guns. No doubt the defeats of Gatacre and Methuen as well as his own injury must have weighed heavily in favour of retiring his forces from Colenso.
The retirement commenced at 11.30 am and took approximately three hours with even more casualties being recorded. The Royal Artillery and the East Surrey’s were detailed to cover the retiring forces. The last to retire were the Royal Navy with their guns under the protection of Bethune and Lyttleton’s mounted infantry. Due to poor communication several troops were not informed of the withdrawal and were consequently taken prisoner. Among them was Colonel Bullock of the Devonshire Regiment.
Ten of Longs Guns were left behind, six from the 14th Battery and four from the 66th. Much ammunition was lost as were many horses and the morning had been costly for Buller. No attempt was made by the Boers to follow the retiring forces but Louis Botha did send his brother-in-law, John Cheere Emmett to collect Long’s guns.
Botha agreed to Buller’s request for an armistice, effective until midnight of 16th December 1899 during which time all the wounded had to be collected. A large hospital was established at Chieveley with four smaller hospitals set up in the surrounding area. More serious cases were sent by train to Estcourt, Pietermaritzburg and Durban.
The tragedy as far as the British were concerned was that throughout the battle of Colenso, the Boers were never put under any pressure. Luckily White did not see the situation in the same light as Buller who in his panic informed White of his failure at Colenso telling him to burn all his codes, fire off his ammunition and secure the best surrender terms possible.
Colenso was a disaster the likes of which the British army had not seen for a very long time. The effect in London is immediate. Buller was told “to get on with the job or hand over to someone who could. At an urgently convened government meeting (it was the
Christmas holidays) it was decided that the command of all the forces in South Africa should be given to Lord Roberts. Roberts agrees and on 17th December 1899 he and Lord Kitchener, as his Commander-in-Chief, prepare to embark for South Africa.