Colonel Carleton

At the battle of Nicholson’s Nek Lieutenant Colonel Carleton of the Leicester regiment was forced to surrender his troops to the Boers when another officer, a Captain Fyffe, raised the white flag. It appeared that ammunition was running low and after consulting with Major Adye, Carleton agreed to the cease-fire. It was later established however, that it was a Captain Duncan of the Gloucesters who had raised the white flag, solely for his own party, and not Colonel Carleton. After the relief of Ladysmith Carleton went on to command communications at Middleburg.

INQUIRY: SURRENDER ON NICHOLSON’S NEK

The following is an extract from the enquiry, Public Record Office London WO 32/8045, held to investigate what went wrong at Nicholson’s Nek during the battle of Ladysmith.

Nicholson’s Nek action:

Committee of Inquiry into the Cases of certain Officers at the War Office 25 June 1901

Captain S.Duncan’s Case; ‘C’ Company Gloucester Regiment.

PRESIDENT: “We have to inquire into the circumstances of the surrender of the force at Nicholson’s Nek at the end of 1899.”

 

The Charge against Captain Duncan: “That you raised the white flag improperly and secondly was taken prisoner.”

Captain Duncan: “I was very angry at having been as I imagined deserted and I considered that the position or our small and isolated party hopeless.” (The idea of Jameson’s force surrendering went through his mind and he thought he was also justified). Duncan had 7 or 8 men and 3 officers, Captain Fyffe, Mr Beasley and himself. All the men had been wounded. Lying behind a kind or semi-circular enclosure and not all under cover behind stones. “Could not see any or our people, not even the remainder or my company. “

“My idea was that it was all up with our small party and believing we were left I simply surrendered our party, I had no idea of compromising anyone else.” (He had no bugler.)

“I felt convinced we were left.” Very Little ammunition left. Only two men were firing when the white flag was put up.

Captain Conner had been in charge or the Regimental Transport, and lost on the way up. He then attached himself to Major Wallace. Captain Connor said: “It is very difficult to say what time elapsed between the hoisting of Captain Duncan’s white flag and the cease fire sounding order or Colonel Carleton. I could not say that we saw the white flag the moment it was put up, perhaps it was five minutes and it might have been only two minutes. Carleton had asked me why the white flag was put up. It was perhaps 10 or 20 seconds after telling Carleton that the bugler sounded the cease-fire.”

Colonel Carleton’s party were still firing when Conner went to Carleton. After the bugler sounded the Fire ceased gradually. When Connor first saw the white flag: “We could see it just over the hill”. At that point he pointed to the position on the map. “We could see it,” he said, “the white flag, just over the crest of the hill. At the same time it was difficult for Carleton to see. I ran over to Carleton. The men with Major Wallace were still firing when I ran over to Colonel Carleton. We had not much ammunition left, we had lost most of it.

All the Boers did not stop firing upon the hoisting of the white flag. Those opposite might have done. I pointed out to Colonel Carleton where the white flag had been raised. Colonel Carleton considered the position hopeless as he took no steps to find out why the flag was put up. He ceased fire without making inquiries. It was the cease-fire from Colonel Carleton that stopped the firing and not the white flag hoisted by Duncan. The white flag did not stop the firing, not many could see it. I do not think the white flag necessitated his surrender.” End or quotes from Captain Connor’s Evidence

NOTE: A party under Lieutenant Maxwell-Scott got back, to Ladysmith, probably left during the stampede. (Lost)

Evidence of Major Adye lntelligence Staff.

”I knew the country very well, I had reconnoitered it. Orders were to seize and hold a strong position at the Nek, or as near as possible, to protect the left flank of the main force. Orders were alternative; to occupy the Nek or the Ground which we did occupy.”

“We ought to have started at 10 pm, but the Irish Fusiliers were delayed because they had not received their ammunition and did not arrive at the starting point until 11.30 pm. This was why Carleton decided to occupy the ground instead or the Nek. We were to occupy the Ground or the Nek defensively to cover the left flank of the main force and to keep it open for the action of cavalry.”

The stampede occurred after the column was diverted. Adye was leading with Carleton: “We were more than half say up the hill, when all or a sudden there was a noise like a passing train…”

The mules had stampeded and passed through the Gloucesters. The Gloucesters lost the heliograph in the stampede, so could not send messages to Limit Hill as planned.

Major Adye: “The advantage in taking up the position at the southern extremity or the ridge was that we could only be seriously attacked from one direction, that is north and north-east.

Adye: “About l900 yards to our front was a rocky prominence, Limit Hill was two miles away, or more.”

Adye said in evidence: “The gunners had brought up 17 boxes of ammunition. Each Irish had 150 rounds on his person and Gloucesters 100 rounds. “I do not know why,” There had been 150 rounds per man on the mules,

Adye: Water bottles were full, although the water kegs were lost on the mules. Food in haversacks for two days.

Adye: The strength was 11 1/2 companies. The half company or artillery men was not or much value.

Adye: “When Carleton ordered the cease-fire there was no firing except by some Irish.

The cease fire was the result of the hoisting of the white flag.”

Adge: “I emphatically think that we could have held on had it not been for the situation created by the white flag and a sufficient amount or ammunition.”

Adye: ”I never could ascertain the expenditure or ammunition but the companies of Irish and Gloucesters lining the southern extremity of ridge could not, I think, have fired all their ammunition; the companies posted in some other parts may have expended a lot,”

Adye: “All our men on the left front had ceased firing and appeared to be mixed up with the Boers, as the men had apparently acted on the white flag. Had Carleton continued firing he would have had to order the Irish Fusiliers to fire into the Gloucesters and Boers mixed up together. The whole right in front had ceased and the Boers were mixed up with our men.”

Adye: “The front line had ceased firing and the Gloucesters were mixed up with the Boers.”

Adye considered that up to the raising or the white flag: “everything was going well and we were giving the Boers as good as we were getting.” He said he did not think that any Boers came over from acting against White’s main force.

Adye said that about midday White sent a heliograph from Limit Hill: “Retire on Ladysmith as opportunity offers. “They could not get their attention and sent a Kaffir runner.

Adye also said: “We could see Nicholson’s Nek from where we were.”

Adye: “All our casualties took place in the last 20 minutes or 1/2 hour and if we had stopped another 5 hours not many would have been left”.

 Major Wallace in command or ‘D’ company, Gloucesters, examined, saw ‘C’ company (Duncan and Fyffe) returning, ie. from his sangar. At the time Captain Duncan and Wallace’s company were the most advanced men. Major Wallace’s initials may have been-WRP.

Adye: “It was 2 pm and we had to stay until 7 pm before we could get away and then through a defile with Boers all around.”

Adye: “0ne hour longer was considered the limit to hold out.”

Major S. Wilcox (Gloucesters) with his advanced party said “The Boers told us they had 70 casualties.”

CASE OF CAPTAIN S. DUNCAN, GLOUCESTER REGIMENT

“The Committee concur in the opinion of the Court of Inquiry held at Pretoria on the 16th June 1900, so far as they consider that Captain Duncan was not justified in ordering the white flag to he hoisted without the authority of the officer in command, but they take exception to the last part or that opinion, and so, the Committee consider that Captain Duncan did not become a prisoner or war through misconduct but owing to the erroneous conception of the situation. The Committee believes that Captain Duncan’s action,

however unjustifiable, was taken under the honest conviction, that its result would be confined to himself and his small party”.

War Office 10 July 1901

The following information is taken from the Royal Commission of the War in South Africa. A court of enquiry on Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton and 11 officers and 23 men of the Royal Irish Fusiliers was held at Pretoria on the 15^th June 1900.

The following is Carleton’s evidence:

October 29^th 1899 Sir George white instructed Colonel Carleton to occupy the kopjes on each side of the pass at the northern end of Nicholson’s Nek, to keep the enemy away from the main force to the east at Rietfontein. 300 rounds of ammunition per rifle were to be carried half by mules along with the battery guns and signalling apparatus.

The force moved out at 11.15 pm on the 29^th. During the climbing of the ridge the mules stampeded to the rear, losing in the process most of the ammunition and signalling apparatus. This left the team without the heliograph a complete artillery piece.

The Gloucesters were drawn up on the left with the Irish Fusiliers on the right, with the ground sloping down there was very little cover. At 5.45 am a message was sent to Sir George White informing him of the situation.

At 7 am the enemy moved down from the rear and occupied the hill on the right. A second message was sent to White at 10 am but did not reach him. At noon a heliograph message was received from town and read “Retire on Ladysmith as opportunity offers”. Unfortunately the action was too hot for this to happen and soon after at 12.45 Carleton heard the cease fire on the left front but thought it a ruse on the enemy’s part. The next thing he saw was an officer coming toward him with a soldier carrying a white flag who informed him that it had been raised by the British. The firing on the left front had now stopped and after consulting with Major Adye Carleton decided there was no other course but to cease fire. Some companies had run out of ammunition whilst others had 50 to 70 rounds left. An on the spot enquiry established that Captain Fyffe, seriously wounded, had raised the flag. Carleton thought that retirement on Ladysmith had become impossible and that he could not have held out for an hour longer.

Major Munn, Royal Irish Fusiliers, on the right flank confirmed Carletons story. Similar evidence was given by Captain Burrowes who had also been on the right flank. The finding of the court was that Lieutenant Colonel Carleton and the other officers and men were taken prisoners by chances of war and not through neglect on their part.

On 16^th June the court exonerated all officers except Captain Duncan who, in their opinion, became a prisoner through his own misconduct and not by reason of the chances of war. He was retired from the service.

In an addendum dated 5^th November 1902 the Royal Commission court of enquiry states that the case against Duncan is still open and Duncan pressed his case by producing witnesses to testify in his favour. These witnesses, were close to Colonel Carleton and confirmed that Duncan’s raising of the white flag for his few men did not affect Carletons decision to surrender the whole force; Major Munn and Captain Burrowes RIF; Majors Humphrey, Wallace and Capel Cure, Captains Fyffe, Duncan and Willcocks, Lieutenants Knox and W.L.B Hill, second Lieutenant Beasley of the Gloucester Regiment; Captain G.R.H.Nugent RGA.